Abstract-We study information-theoretic security for discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with independent confidential messages sent to two receivers. Confidential messages are transmitted to their respective receivers with informationtheoretic secrecy. That is, each receiver is kept in total ignorance with respect to the message intended for the other receiver. The secrecy level is measured by the equivocation rate at the eavesdropping receiver. In this paper, we present inner and outer bounds on secrecy capacity regions for these two communication systems. The derived outer bounds have an identical mutual information expression that applies to both channel models. The difference is in the input distributions over which the expression is optimized. The inner bound rate regions are achieved by random binning techniques. For the broadcast channel, a doublebinning coding scheme allows for both joint encoding and preserving of confidentiality. Furthermore, we show that, for a special case of the interference channel, referred to as the switch channel, the two bound bounds meet. Finally, we describe several transmission schemes for Gaussian interference channels and derive their achievable rate regions while ensuring mutual information-theoretic secrecy. An encoding scheme in which transmitters dedicate some of their power to create artificial noise is proposed and shown to outperform both time-sharing and simple multiplexed transmission of the confidential messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of a wireless medium allows for the transmitted signal to be received by all users within the communication range. Hence, wireless communication sessions are very susceptible to eavesdropping. The information-theoretic single user secure communication problem was first characterized using the wiretap channel model proposed by Wyner [1] . In this model, a single source-destination communication link is eavesdropped by a wiretapper via a degraded channel. The secrecy level is measured by the equivocation rate at the wiretapper. Wyner showed that secure communication is possible without sharing a secret key between legitimate users, R. Liu is with Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA (email: rliu@princeton.edu).
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and determined the tradeoff between the transmission rate and the secrecy level [1] . This result was generalized by Csiszár and Körner who determined the capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages [2] in which a message intended for one of the receivers is confidential.
Following the work of Wyner [1] and Csiszár and Körner [2] , the more recent information-theoretic research on secure communication focuses at implementing security on the physical layer. Based on independent efforts, the authors of [3] and [4] described achievable secure rate regions and outer bounds for a two-user discrete memoryless multiple access channel with confidential messages. This model generalizes the multiple access channel (MAC) [5, Sec. 14.3] by allowing each user (or one of the users) to receive noisy channel outputs and, hence, to eavesdrop the confidential information sent by the other user. In addition, the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel has been analyzed in [6] - [10] . The relay channel with confidential messages where the relay node acts as both a helper and a wiretapper has been considered in [11] . The relay-eavesdropper channel has been proposed in [12] . More recently, the cognitive interference channel with confidential messages has been addressed in [13] . The effects of fading on secure wireless communication have been studied in [14] - [18] .
In this paper, we study two distinct but related in multi-terminal secure communication problems following the information-theoretic approach. We focus on discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with independent confidential messages sent to two receivers. Confidential messages are transmitted to their respective receivers while ensuring mutual information-theoretic secrecy. That is, each receiver is kept in total ignorance with respect to the message intended for the other receiver. We first derive outer bounds on capacity regions for these two communication systems. These bounds have an identical mutual information expression. The expression is optimized over different input distributions, i.e., for the interference channel, the two senders offer independent inputs to the channel and, for the broadcast channel, the sender jointly encodes both messages. We also derive achievable rate regions for the two channel models. Here, we only consider sending confidential messages and, hence, no common message in the sense of Marton [19] is conveyed to the receivers in the case of the broadcast channel. The inner bounds are achieved using random binning techniques. For the broadcast channel, a double-binning coding scheme which allows for both joint precoding as in the classical broadcast channel [19] , and preserving of confidentiality. Similarly, ensuring of confidential messages precludes partial decoding of the message intended for the other receiver in the case of the interference channel. Hence, rate-splitting encoding used by Carleial [20] and Han and Kobayashi [21] employed with the classical interference channel is precluded. Instead, the encoders will use only stochastic encoders. We show that for the special case of the interference channel, referred to as the switch channel, derived bounds meet. Finally, we describe several transmission schemes for general Gaussian interference channels and derive their achievable rate regions while still ensuring information-theoretic secrecy. An encoding scheme in which transmitters dedicate some of their power to create artificial noise is proposed and shown to outperform both time-sharing and simple multiplexed transmission of the confidential messages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The notation and the channel model are given in Sec. II. We state the main results in Sec. III. Outer bounds are derived in Sec. IV. Inner bounds associated with the achievable coding scheme for the interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages are established in Sec. V. Finally, the results are summarized in Sec. VI.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS

A. Notations
Throughout the paper, a random variable is denoted with an upper case letter (e.g., X), its realization is denoted with the corresponding lower case letter (e.g., x), the finite alphabet of the random variable is denoted with the corresponding calligraphic letter (e.g., X ), and its probability distribution is denoted with P X (x). For example, the random variable X with probability distribution P (x) = P X (x) takes on values in the finite alphabet X . A boldface symbol denotes a sequence with the following conventions
Finally, we use A (n) ǫ (P X ) to denote the set of (weakly) jointly typical sequences x with respect to P (x) (see [5] for more details).
B. The Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
Consider a discrete memoryless interference channel with finite input alphabets X 1 , X 2 , finite output alphabets Y 1 , Y 2 , and the channel transition probability distribution P (y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ). Two transmitters wish to send independent, confidential messages to their respective receivers. We refer to such a channel as the interference channel with confidential messages (IC-CM). This communication model is shown in Fig. 1 . Symbols (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ (X 1 × X 2 ) are the channel inputs at transmitters 1 and 2, and (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ (Y 1 × Y 2 ) are the channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
Transmitter t, t = 1, 2, intends to send an independent message W t ∈ {1, . . . , M t } to the desired receiver t in n channel uses while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy. The channel is memoryless in the sense that
A stochastic encoder for transmitter t is described by a matrix of conditional probabilities f t (x t |w t ), where x t ∈ X n t , w t ∈ W t , and
Decoding functions are mappings ψ t : Y t → W t . Secrecy levels at receivers 1 and 2 are measured with respect to the equivocation rates 1 n H(W 2 |Y 1 ) and
e ) code for the interference channel consists of two encoding functions f 1 , f 2 , two decoding functions ψ 1 , ψ 2 , and the corresponding maximum average error probability
where, for t = 1, 2,
A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable for the interference channel with confidential messages if, for any ǫ 0 > 0,
and the reliability requirement
and the security constraints
are satisfied. This definition corresponds to the so-called weak secrecy-key rate [22] . A stronger measurement of the secrecy level has been defined by Maurer and Wolf in terms of the absolute equivocation [22] , where the authors have shown that the former definition could be replaced by the latter without any rate penalty for the wiretap channel. The capacity region of the IC-CM is the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ), denoted by C IC . 
C. The Broadcast Channel
We also consider the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BC-CM) in which secret messages from a single transmitter are to be communicated to two receivers, as shown in Fig. 2 . A discrete memoryless BC-CM is described using finite sets X , Y 1 , Y 2 , and a conditional probability distribution P (y 1 , y 2 |x). Symbols x ∈ X are channel inputs and (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ (Y 1 ×Y 2 ) are channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2, respectively. The transmitter intends to send an independent message W t ∈ {1, . . . , M t } W t to the respective receiver t ∈ {1, 2} in n channel uses while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy as given by (5a) and (5b). The channel is memoryless in the sense that
A stochastic encoder is specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities f (x|w 1 , w 2 ), where x ∈ X n , w t ∈ W t , and
Note that f (x|w 1 , w 2 ) is the probability that the pair of messages (w 1 , w 2 ) are encoded as the channel input x. The decoding function at the receiver t is a mapping φ t : Y t → W t . The secrecy levels of confidential messages W 2 and W 1 are measured, respectively, at receivers 1 and 2 in terms of the equivocation rates (1). An (M 1 , M 2 , n, P (n) e ) code for the broadcast channel consists of the encoding function f , decoding functions φ 1 , φ 2 , and the maximum error probability P (n) e in (2), where, for t = 1, 2,
A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable for the broadcast channel with confidential messages if, for any ǫ 0 > 0, there exists a (M 1 , M 2 , n, P (n) e ) code which satisfies (3)-(5). The capacity region of the BC-CM is the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ), denoted by C BC .
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our main results. We first describe the outer and inner bounds on the capacity regions of both interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages. We then show that the derived bounds meet for a special case of the interference channel, called the switch channel.
Finally, we propose several transmission schemes for Gaussian interference channels and derive their achievable rate regions under information-theoretic secrecy.
A. Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
Let U , V 1 , and V 2 be auxiliary random variables. We consider the following two classes of joint distributions for the interference channel. Let π IC−O be the class of distributions P (u, v 1 , v 2 , x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) that factor as P (u)P (v 1 , v 2 |u)P (x 1 |v 1 )P (x 2 |v 2 )P (y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ), (7) and π IC−I be the class of distributions that factor as
with confidential messages, the capacity region
Proof: We provide the proof of Theorem 1 in Sec. IV.
is achievable for the interference channel with confidential messages. Proof: We provide the proof in Sec. V-A. To derive the achievable rate region for the IC-CM, we employ an auxiliary random variable U in the sense of HanKobayashi [21] . For a given U , we consider two independent stochastic encoders, that is, the pre-coding auxiliary random variables V 1 and V 2 will be independent for a given U , as given by (8) . To ensure information-theoretic secrecy, the achievable rate R 1 includes a penalty term I(V 1 ; Y 2 |V 2 , U ), which is a conditional mutual information of the receiver 2's eavesdropper channel while assuming the receiver 2 can first decode its own information.
B. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
For the broadcast channel, we focus on the class of distributions P (u, v 1 , v 2 , x, y 1 , y 2 ) that factor as
We refer to this class as π BC .
over all distributions P (u, v 1 , v 2 , x, y 1 , y 2 ) in π BC and auxiliary random variables U , V 1 , and V 2 satisfying
For the broadcast channel (X , P (y 1 , y 2 |x), Y 1 × Y 2 ) with confidential messages, the capacity region
Proof: We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in Sec. IV. Remark 1: Outer bounds for the BC-CM and the IC-CM have a same mutual information expression R O (·), but, they are optimized over different input distributions π BC and
is achievable for the broadcast channel with confidential messages. Proof: We provide the proof in Sec. V-B. We note that, for a broadcast channel, we can employ joint encoding at the transmitter. Hence, the achievable coding scheme for the BC-CM is based on the double-binning scheme which combines the Gel'fand-Pinsker binning [23] and the random binning. To preserve confidentiality, the achievability bounds on R 1 and R 2 each include the penalty term I(V 1 ; V 2 |U ). Without the confidentiality constraint, Marton's inner bound [19] on the broadcast channel illustrates only that the sum rate has the penalty term I(V 1 ; V 2 |U ). To ensure information-theoretic secrecy, the proposed coding scheme pays "double" when jointly encoding at the transmitter.
Example 1: [less noisy broadcast channel] Consider a special class of broadcast channels in which the channel X → Y 1 is less noisy than the channel X → Y 2 , i.e.,
for every
. We first consider the outer bound of the less noisy BC-CM. Based on the Markov chains in (13) and the definition (15), we have
which implies that
Hence the outer bound can be rewritten as the union of all (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
where (16a) follows from [2, Theorem 3] . Next, by applying Theorem 4 and setting V 2 = U = const, we obtain the identical rate region as (16) . This result implies that only the "better" user can get the non-zero secrecy rate for the less noisy BC-CM. Note that, the single-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel is a special case of the less noisy broadcast channel.
In the following, we consider a sufficient condition under which both R 1 and R 2 can be strictly positive for the BC-CM.
then both receivers can achieve strictly positive rates while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy.
Proof: The result is obtained by applying Theorem 4 and by setting R 1 > 0 and R 2 > 0. More recently, motivated by this work, the multiple-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages was studied in [24] . It was shown that with multiple antennas at transmitters, strictly positive rates to both receivers can be achieved while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy.
C. Switch Channel
In this subsection, we obtain the secrecy capacity region for a special case of the interference channel referred to as the switch channel (SC). As shown in Fig. 3 , receivers in the SC cannot listen to both transmissions (from encoders 1 and 2) at the same time. For example, each encoder may transmit at a different frequency, while each receiver may listen only to one frequency during each symbol time i. We assume that each receiver t ∈ {1, 2} has a random switch s t ∈ {1, 2}, which chooses between t andt independently at each symbol time i with probabilities
wheret is the complement of t. Therefore, receiver t listens to its own information x t,i from encoder t whenever S t,i = t, while it eavesdrops the signal xt ,i when S t,i =t. By assuming that the switch state information is available at the receiver, we have that The switch state information
is an i.i.d. process known at receiver t. Hence, we can consider s t,i as a part of the channel output, i.e., we set
where z t,i represents the received signal value at receiver t.
Under this setting, we have the following theorem on the secrecy capacity region C SC of SC-CM. Theorem 5: For the switch channel with confidential messages, the capacity region C SC is the union of all (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
We provide the proof in the Appendix. Remark 2: In SC-CM, receiver t listens to the desired information during time fraction τ t , and intercepts the other message during the time fraction (1 − τ t ). When τ 1 = τ 2 = 1, both receivers only listen to their own messages and thus SC-CM reduces to two independent parallel channels without the secrecy constraints. When τ 1 = 1 and τ 2 = 0, receiver 2 acts as an eavesdropper only and both Y 1 and Y 2 are independent with respect to the message W 2 . Hence, in this case, SC-CM reduces to the wiretap channel [1] .
Example 2: [noiseless memoryless switch channel] We assume that the channel is discrete memoryless and that the input-output relationship at each time instant satisfies
where P (S t,i = t) = τ t and τ 1 + τ 2 ≥ 1. Theorem 5 implies that the secrecy capacity region of this channel is:
We note that here τ 1 + τ 2 − 1 equals τ 1 − (1 − τ 2 ), the time that user 1 sends without user 2 listening and also equals τ 2 − (1 − τ 1 ), the time that user 2 sends without user 1 listening.
D. Gaussian Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
We next consider a Gaussian interference channel (GIC) with confidential messages (GIC-CM) where each node employs a single antenna as shown in Fig. 4 . We have proposed this problem originally in [25] . 
Fig. 4. Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages
We assume the channel input and output symbols to be from an alphabet of real numbers. Following the standard form GIC [20] , the received symbols are
where α 1 and α 2 are normalized crossover channel gains, X 1 and X 2 are transmitted symbols from encoders 1 and 2 with the average power constraint
and N 1 and N 2 correspond to two independent, zero-mean, unit-variance, Gaussian noise variables. In the following, we focus on the weak interference channel, i.e., 0 ≤ α 2 1 < 1 and 0 ≤ α 2 2 < 1. We describe three transmission schemes and their achievable rate regions under the requirement of informationtheoretic secrecy.
1) Time-Sharing:
The transmission period is divided into two non-overlapping slots with time fractions ρ 1 and ρ 2 , where ρ 1 ≥ 0, ρ 2 ≥ 0, and ρ 1 + ρ 2 = 1. Transmitter t sends confidential message W t in slot t with time fraction ρ t , t = 1, 2. We refer to this technique as the time-sharing scheme. We note that, in each slot, the channel reduces to a Gaussian wiretap channel [26] . Let R [T] GIC denote the set of
over all time fractions (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) pairs. Following [26] , we can show that any rate pair
is achievable for GIC-CM.
2) Multiplexed Transmission:
In the multiplexed transmission scheme, we allow communication links to share the same degrees of freedom. Since we require information-theoretic secrecy for confidential messages, no partial decoding of the other transmitter's message is allowed at a receiver. Hence, the interference results in an increase of the noise floor. Let By independently choosing
and letting U serve as a convex combination operator, Theorem 2 implies that any rate pair
is achievable for GIC-CM, where
GIC denotes the convex hull of the set of (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
over all power-control parameters β 1 and β 2 .
3) Artificial Noise: We next describe a scheme which allows one of the transmitters (e.g., transmitter 2) to generate artificial noise. This strategy involves splitting of the transmission power of transmitter 2 into two parts P 2,M and P 2,A , where
P 2,A = λβ 2 P 2 , and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, so that transmitter 2 encodes the confidential message with power P 2,M and generates artificial noise with power P 2,A . The artificial noise can spoil the received signal of receiver 2 and, hence, protect the confidential message of transmitter 1. In this sense, this scheme allows transmitter cooperation without exchanging confidential messages. Let U serve as a convex combination operator,
where V 1 , V 2 , and A 2 are independent Gaussian random variables:
and
Here A 2 denotes the artificial noise which cannot be predicted and subtracted by either receiver. Since
we have
Similarly, we can calculate
Applying Theorem 2, we can prove that any rate pair
is achievable for GIC-CM, where R
[A]
over all power-control parameter pair (β 1 , β 2 ) and the powersplitting parameter λ. Furthermore, the achievable region can be increased by reversing the roles of transmitters 1 and 2. Remark 3: We note that secure communication in a Gaussian channel with two senders and two receivers was also considered in [9] , [10] for the Gaussian MAC with a wiretapper (GMAC-WT). In this setting, both messages are to be conveyed to one of the receivers and none to the other receiver. Although the two problem formulations differ, the absence of rate splitting in the interference channel results in that the two proposed encoding schemes have a closer relationship than the schemes suggested for the classical MAC and interference channels. In fact, the encoding scheme proposed in [9] , [10] for the GMAC-WT, referred to as cooperative jamming, and our encoding scheme which creates artificial noise in (26) are the same.
Example 3: In Fig. 5 , we compare the achievable regions:
GIC , and R 
IV. OUTER BOUND
In this section we prove Theorems 1 and 3. In the following, we derive the upper bound for R 1 . The upper bound for R 2 follows by symmetry.
The basis for the outer bound derivation is the reliable transmission requirement and the security constraint. Based on Fano's inequality [5] , the reliable transmission requirement (4) implies that
where h(x) is the binary entropy function. On the other hand, the security constraint (5a) implies that
In fact, the bound (9) on R 1 is based on the following two different upper bounds on the equivocation H(W 1 |Y 2 ).
A. First Bound
The first upper bound is derived by applying the techniques in [2] . By using Fano's inequality (28a), we obtain the following bound on the equivocation
Let
Since
and we can rewrite (30) as follows
Note that
Hence, the bound (32) can be expressed as follows
Inequalities (29) and (33) imply that
Now, for δ δ 1 + ǫ 0 , we have
Following [5, Chapter 14], we introduce a random variable Q uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} and independent of (W 1 , W 2 , X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 ). Now we can bound R 1 as follows
Note that, under the setting (36), the conditional distribution of P (y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ) coincides with the original channel transition probability. We can rewrite (35) as
Remark 4: Note that we employ only Fano's inequality (28a) to derive the first bound on R 1 .
B. Second Bound
The basic idea of the second bound can be described as follows. We assume that a genie gives receiver 1 message W 2 , while receiver 2 attempts to evaluate the equivocation with W 2 as side information. Now, the equivocation can be upper bounded by
By applying (28a) and (28b), we have
, we can further bound (38) as follows
Let δ ′ = δ 1 + δ 2 + ǫ 0 . Following the same approach as in (30)- (36), we obtain
Remark 5: In order to get the second bound on R 1 , we employ the requirement that not only receiver 1 can decode the message W 1 successfully, but also receiver 2 can decode the message W 2 successfully in (39) and (40) and, hence, we use Fano's inequalities (28a) and (28b).
C. Outer Bound and Discussion
Combining the two upper bounds (37) with (41) and assuming that δ and δ ′ converge to 0, we have
Similarly, we can bound R 2 as
Note that from (31) and (36) it follows that the joint distribution P (u, v 1 , v 2 , x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) factors as (7) for the interference channel. For the broadcast channel, we replace (X 1 , X 2 )
by X X Q . Now, the joint distribution P (u, v 1 , v 2 , x, y 1 , y 2 ) factors as (11) .
To consider the sum rate we let
The bounds (42) and (43) imply the the following bounds on the sum rate:
where the bounds (44) and (45) are using either the first bounding approach (see Sec. IV-A) or the second bounding approach (see Sec. IV-B) only, and the bound (46) are based on both approaches. The following lemma illustrates that the combination sum rate bound (46) is indeed tighter than bounds (44) and (45). Lemma 1:
Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix. It is interesting to further analyze the outer bound by comparing bounds (37) and (41). By assuming that δ and δ ′ converge to 0, the difference between these two bounds is
We observe that, in general, the difference between bounds (37) and (41) is non-zero.
V. INNER BOUND
A. Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
In this subsection we derive the achievable rate region for the interference channel. We prove that the region R IC (π IC−I ) is achievable. The coding structure for the IC-CM is illustrated in Fig. 6 . We employ an auxiliary random variable U in the sense of Han-Kobayashi [21] and two equivocation codebooks (stochastic encoders), one for each message W 1 and W 2 . Encoder t maps v t into a channel input x t . More precisely, the random code generation is as follows.
Fix P (u), P (v 1 |u) and P (v 2 |u), and
and let
where ǫ 1 > 0 and ǫ 1 is small for sufficiently large n. 
and assume that both transmitters and receivers know the time-sharing sequence u. For transmitter t, t = 1, 2, generate Q t = 2
independent sequences v t each with probability
and labeled as
Without loss of generality, M t , M ′ t , and Q t are assumed to be integers.
be the codebook of Transmitter t. Its w t -th sub-codebook (bin)
follows the partitioning in (50).
• [encoding] To send a message pair
each transmitter employs a stochastic encoder. Encoder t randomly chooses an element v t (w t , k t ) from the subcodebook C t (w t ). Transmitters generate the channel input sequences based on respective mappings P (x 1 |v 1 ) and P (x 2 |v 2 ).
• [decoding] Given a typical sequence u, let A (n) ǫ (P Vt,Yt|U ) denote the set of jointly typical sequences v t and y t with respect to P (v t , y t |u) [5] . Decoder t chooses w t so that
ǫ (P Vt,Yt|U ) when such w t exists and and is unique; otherwise, an error is declared. 1) Error Probability Analysis: To bound the probability of error, we define the event
Without loss of generality, we can assume that transmitter 1 sends the message w 1 = 1 associated with the codeword v 1 (1, 1) , and define the corresponding event 1 (1, 1) sent}.
The union bound on the error probability of receiver 1 is as follows
Following the joint asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [5] , we have
and, for w 1 = 1,
Hence, we can bound the probability of error as
e,1 ≤ ǫ 0 for sufficiently large n. Similarly, for receiver 2, if
e,2 ≤ ǫ 0 for sufficiently large n. Hence, P (n) e ≤ ǫ 0 as long as the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R IC (π IC−I ).
2) Equivocation Calculation: To show that (5a) holds, we consider the following equivocation lower bound
where inequality (51) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. By applying the entropy chain rule [5] , (51) can be expanded as follows
Based on functional dependence graphs [27] and the random code construction, we can show that the following is a Markov chain
Hence, by using (52) and (53), we obtain
We consider the first term in (54). Note that given U = u, V 1 and V 2 are independent and V 1 has Q 1 possible values with equal probability. Hence,
We next show that
, where ǫ 2 is small for sufficiently large n. In order to calculate the conditional entropy H(V 1 |Y 2 , V 2 , U, W 1 ), we consider the following situation. We fix W 1 = w 1 , and assume that transmitter 1 transmits a codeword
, and that receiver 2 knows the sequences V 2 = v 2 and U = u. Given index W 1 = w 1 , receiver 2 decodes the codeword v 1 (w 1 , k 1 ) based on the received sequence y 2 . Let λ(w 1 ) denote the average probability of error of decoding the index k 1 at receiver 2. Based on joint typicality [5, Chapter 8], we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: λ(w 1 ) ≤ ǫ 0 for sufficiently large n. Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix. Fano's inequality implies that
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2 and (48). Consequently,
Finally, the third term in (54) can be bounded based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3:
where ǫ 3 is small for sufficiently large n. Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix. By using (55), (57), and (58), we can rewrite (54) as 
where ǫ 4 ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 , and, thus, the security condition (5a) is satisfied. Following the same approach, we can prove that (5b) is satisfied.
B. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
We next prove Theorem 4 based on the double-binning scheme which combines the Gel'fand-Pinsker binning [23] and the random binning. In this subsection we redefine the parameters
, and M 2 . The coding structure for the BC-CM is shown in Fig. 7 . We employ a joint encoder to generate two equivocation codewords v 1 and v 2 , one for each message W 1 and W 2 . The equivocation codewords are mapped into the channel input x. The details of random code generation are as follows.
We fix P (u), P (v 1 |u) and P (v 2 |u), as well as
where ǫ ′ 1 > 0 and ǫ ′ 1 is small for sufficiently large n.
• [codebook generation] We generate randomly a typical sequence u with probability
and assume that both the transmitter and the receivers know the sequence u. We generate Q t = 2 n(Rt+R ′ t +R † ) independent sequences v t each with probability
and label them v t (w t , s t , k t ), w t ∈ {1, . . . , M t }, s t ∈ {1, . . . , J t }, and k t ∈ {1, . . . , G t }.
where M t = 2 nRt , J t = 2 nR ′ t , and G t = 2 nR † . Without loss of generality Q t , M t , J t , and G t are considered to be integers. Let
vt (1,1,1) ... denote the transmitter t codebook. Based on the labeling in (62), the codebook C t is partitioned into M t bins, and the w t -th bin is
Furthermore, each bin C t (w t ) is divided into J t sub-bins, and the (w t , s t )-th sub-bin is
The double binning structure for v t sequences is shown in Fig. 8 .
To send the message pair (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ W 1 × W 2 , the transmitter employs a stochastic encoder. We randomly choose a sub-bin C t (w t , s t ) from the bin C t (w t ), for t = 1, 2. Next, we select a pair (k 1 , k 2 ) so that
where A (n) ǫ (P V1,V2|U ) denotes, for a given typical sequence u, the set of jointly typical sequences v 1 and v 2 with respect to P (v 1 , v 2 |u). If there are more than one such pairs, then we randomly select one. We generate the channel input sequence x according to the mapping P (x|v 1 , v 2 ).
• [decoding] For a given typical sequence u, let A (n) ǫ (P Vt,Yt|U ) denote the set of jointly typical sequences v t and y t with respect to P (v t , y t |u). Decoder t chooses w t so that (v t (w t , s t , k t ), y t ) ∈ A (n) ǫ (P Vt,Yt|U ) if such w t exists and is unique; otherwise, an error is declared.
1) Error Probability Analysis:
Without loss of generality, we assume that the message pair is (w 1 = 1, w 2 = 1) and that s 1 = s 2 = 1. First, we consider the error event T that the encoder can not find an appropriate jointly typical pair, i.e.,
ǫ (P V1,V2|U ), for s t = 1, . . . , J t , k t = 1, . . . , G t , and t = 1, 2}.
The definition of R † in (61) implies that
Hence, following the approach of [28] , we have that
where δ 3 > 0 and δ 3 is small for sufficiently large n. In other words, the encoding is successful with probability close to 1 as long as n is large. In the following, we assume that (v 1 (1, 1, 1), v 2 (1, 1, 1)) is sent and define the event 1, 1, 1), v 2 (1, 1, 1) ) ∈ A (n) ǫ (P V1,V2|U )}. Now, the error probability at receiver 1 is bounded as follows
Joint typicality [5, Chapter 14] implies that
then for any ǫ 0 > 0, P
then P (n) e,2 ≤ ǫ 0 for sufficiently large n. Hence, (2), (60), (61), (66), and (67) imply that P (n) e ≤ ǫ 0 as long as the rate pair
2) Equivocation Calculation: We next prove that the secrecy requirement (5a) holds for BC-CM. Following the same approach as (51)-(54), we have
Consider the first term in (68)
Note that given U = u, V 1 attains Q 1 possible values with equal probability. Hence, we have H(V 1 |U) = log Q 1 . Using the same approach as in Lemma 3, we can obtain
Hence, by the definition of R † in (61), we have
Following joint typicality [5] , (57) implies
where ǫ ′ 3 is small for sufficiently large n. Applying Lemma 3, the third term in (68) can be bounded as
where ǫ ′ 4 is small for sufficiently large n and the equality (71) follows from the definition (60). Hence, by using (69), (70), and (71), we can rewrite (68) as
where ǫ
, and thus the security condition (5a) is satisfied. Following the same approach, we can prove that (5b) also holds.
VI. CONCLUSION
We derived the outer and the inner bounds on the capacity of the interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages. The obtained results offer insights into the two communication problems. The difference in the outer bound reflects the fact that the joint encoding at the transmitter can only be performed in the BC-CM whereas in the IC-CM, encoders offer independent channel inputs. The achievability proof suggests the code construction appropriate for these channel. We presented a special case of IC-CM for which the two bounds meet to describe the capacity region. We proposed and compared several transmission schemes for Gaussian interference channels under information-theoretic secrecy. In particular, the encoding scheme in which transmitters dedicate some of their power to create artificial noise was shown to outperform both time-sharing and simultaneous transmission of messages sent with the optimal power. However, constructing practical wiretap codes that can achieve the derived rates is a challenging problem. Code constructions for a binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel have recently been proposed in [29] . 
Similarly,
(72) and (73) imply that
Hence,
We have the derived results.
Proof: (Lemma 2) For a given typical sequence pair (v 2 , u), let A (n) ǫ (P V1,Y2|V2,U ) denote the set of jointly typical sequences v 1 and y 2 with respect to P (v 1 , y 2 |v 2 , u). For a given W 1 = w 1 , decoder 2 chooses k 1 so that
if such k 1 exists and is unique; otherwise, an error is declared. Define the event E(k 1 ) = {(v 1 (w 1 , k 1 ), y 2 ) ∈ A (n) ǫ (P V1,Y2|V2,U )}. Without loss of generality, we assume that v 1 (w 1 , k 1 = 1) was sent, and define the event 
Note that P (µ = 1)I(V 1 ; Y 2 |V 2 , U, µ = 1)
We only consider the term P (µ = 0)I(V 1 ; Y 2 |V 2 , U, µ = 0). Proof: (Theorem 5) Since the switch channel is a special case of the interference channel, we focus on the outer bound (9) and the inner bound (10) for the SC-CM case.
We note that the distribution π IC−I implies that, for a given U , auxiliary random variables V 1 and V 2 are independent, but this may not hold for the distribution π IC−O . Hence, we need to first show that the condition 
that is, the outer bound (9) meets the inner bound (10) . Now, we prove that conditions (79) and (80) 
Now, for a given s t,i , the switch channel model (18) implies that z t,i only depend on the channel input x st,i,i . By using functional dependence graphs [27] , we can easily verify that 
